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Abstract
This paper examines shareholder proposals provided by Institutional Shareholder
Services from 2013 to 2020. It analyzes (1) the breakdown between SRI-related and governance
related shareholder proposals over time and across industries, (2) trends in passage rates of
SRI-related proposals over time and across industries, and (3) the relationship between passage
rates of shareholder proposals and the ESG scores of the target firms. Using a simple linear
regression, we find that (1) SRI-related proposal passage rates are on average 9.78% less than
their non-SRI counterparts, when controlling for year fixed effects, (2) the average increase in
passage rates of SRI-related proposals per year is 0.4%, (3) target companies whose proposals
are passed by their shareholders have significantly poorer ESG-performance than target
companies whose proposals did not pass, and this effect is augmented when looking specifically
at SRI-related proposals.
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Introduction
In March of 2021, the world’s largest asset managers, including Blackrock and Vanguard,
joined the Net Zero Asset Managers Initiative, pledging to have entirely carbon-neutral
investments by 2050. This served as a sort of culmination of the moves made by mutual funds,
index funds, and other institutional investors into environmental, social, and governance issues,
referred to collectively as “ESG.” It is becoming increasingly clear that as Americans care more
about climate change and hold corporations accountable for their carbon footprint, ESG has
become a critical component of the long-term, nonmarket business strategies of any company,
and therefore also of investors.
The significance of this commitment to the Net Zero Asset Managers Initiative was
demonstrated in the instrumentality of Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street in the successful
activist campaign against ExxonMobil by hedge fund Engine No. 1 in May of 2021. Despite
owning just 0.02% of ExxonMobil’s shares (a $40 million dollar stake), the campaign
successfully replaced three of its board members. At the time of the proxy battle, which began in
December 2020 with Engine No. 1’s founder Christopher James writing an open letter to the
company’s board of directors, ExxonMobil was struggling with poor performance, having just
ended its 92-year run in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and reporting a $22 billion
loss that year.
What is important to note is that while environmental issues, specifically ExxonMobil’s
well-documented history of climate change denial and active efforts against climate change
solutions, were the source concern, the focus of Engine No. 1’s messaging was actually the
financial consequences of this behavior, calling it an “existential risk.” By highlighting how
ExxonMobil’s return on capital employed (ROCE) on upstream projects (the supermajority of

the company’s capital expenditures) had fallen from 25% in the 2000s to a dismal 6% in the last
five years, Engine No. 1 successfully argued that the starting point for realizing better long-term
capital allocation discipline was through a change in corporate governance, with leadership that
recognized climate risks as a key business consideration. In this respect, the classical trade-off
between “good and gold,” that is, between social impact and financial returns, was presented
instead as a way of using one to augment the other.
To be clear, ESG-related shareholder activism is no new phenomenon, although ESG is
becoming important to more people and more salient amongst those that do care about it.
Institutional investors have played the largest role in ESG-related activism thus far. For instance,
CalPERS, the largest pension fund in the U.S., has been a longtime leader in institutional
activism. In addition to traditional issues related to corporate governance, their shareholder
activism engagements have also included issues related to greenhouse gas emissions, auto fuel
efficiency, screen addiction in adolescents, and even apartheid in South Africa prior to 1994.
There are well-established mutual funds such as the Green Century Fund and Parnassus that
utilize ESG rankings and value-based screens for their investments, while simultaneously
engaging in shareholder advocacy to achieve social impact. There is a trend of an increasing
percentage of institutional investors factoring ESG into their investment-decision making process
according to Callan’s annual ESG survey.
On Wall Street and beyond, the news of Engine No. 1’s victory against a company like
ExxonMobil spurred conversation about a possible new trend in the space–the involvement of
activist hedge funds. As Institutional Investor observes, recently “‘name-brand’ activists like
Jana Partners, Trian Partners, and ValueAct Capital” have incorporated ESG concerns into their
activities. Indeed, on the heels of Engine No. 1’s success, Daniel Loeb’s Third Point, another

activist hedge fund, took a $750 million stake in Royal Dutch Shell and wrote a letter to its
investors calling for the breakup of the oil company into two standalone companies–separating
its legacy oil and refinery business from its renewables business, in which it began investing
more after a Dutch court ruled that Shell must cut its carbon emissions by 40% by 2030. Third
Point increased its stake in the company in May 2022 and in the first quarter of this year, Shell’s
renewables business was profitable for the first time. These exciting developments are precisely
what makes the growing presence of ESG in shareholder activism an interesting topic of study.
In this paper, I will first discuss the theory surrounding shareholder activism and provide
an overview of the different forms of activism. Next, I review the existing literature that provides
empirical evidence on the success rates, effects on financial performance, and the social impact
of shareholder activism. Finally, using data from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and
Standard and Poor’s over the period of 2013-2020, this paper will focus specifically on
shareholder proposals. I analyze the makeup of resolution types, the success rates of resolution
types across industries and years, and the relationship between ESG scores and the success rates
of shareholder proposals. This paper aims to answer questions about investor sentiment towards
ESG as measured by their willingness to vote for ESG-related proposals–have more ESG-related
proposals been introduced in recent years? Are investors more likely to pass proposals in certain
industries or for companies with poor ESG scores? Has support for ESG-related proposals
increased over time?

Background & Review of Literature
Shareholder activism can be defined as a range of activities by one or more of a publicly
traded corporation’s shareholders that are intended to result in some change in the corporation’s
practices or strategy. The important dynamic to understand for why shareholder activism can be

successful is that activists seek to impose costs on target companies that are greater than the cost
of submitting to the demands. While the goal of shareholder activism is traditionally thought of
to be unlocking financial value for shareholders, “non-financial” shareholder activism involves
activities whose purpose is social change–for instance, shareholder proposals by religious groups
or non-profit advocacy groups.
Any shareholder may engage in activism, but the type of investor that typically does so is
often disproportionate to who owns company stock. The graphic below illustrates the spread of
ownership of U.S. companies’ stock among institutional investors like mutual funds, pensions,
and ETFs; retail investors; hedge funds; and others, including foreign holders and governments.
Institutional investors represent the largest slice of the pie and indeed play an important role in
activism, often seeking changes that deliver long-term value. Despite only owning 2% of U.S.
company stock, activist hedge funds play an outsized role in shareholder activism because they
are funded by investors seeking big returns. Global hedge fund assets under management (AUM)
has grown rapidly from $2.3 billion in 2016 to nearly $4 billion in 2020.

Shareholder activism can take many forms that vary in the level of aggression. The least
public and least aggressive form is negotiations with management or the board, where the
investor expresses their concerns about the company and hopes to reach a solution. Second,
shareholder proposals or resolutions, which are the focus of this paper, make a recommendation
to a company’s board of directors on specific actions to take and are generally presented at
annual shareholder meetings. Shareholder proposals can be submitted by any investor who has
held more than $2,000 of stock or a 1% stake for at least one year, but investors are limited to
one per year. If it can successfully get past a company’s challenge at the SEC, the resolution will
be added to the company’s proxy statement and put up for a vote at the company’s annual
general meeting (AGM). Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis provide
recommendations for voting on shareholder proposals as the two dominant proxy advisory
services in the U.S., with market shares of 61% and 37%, respectively.
A number of papers have examined the impact of ISS’s recommendations on shareholder
voting behavior. Cotter, Palmiter, and Thomas (2010) found that the correlation between mutual
fund voting decisions and ISS recommendations was stronger than that with management
recommendations when analyzing data from 2003-2008. Choi, Fisch, and Kahan (2010),
analyzing voting data from uncontested director elections, argue that the influence of ISS is
overstated and estimate that ISS recommendations shift between 6-10% of shareholder votes
once controlling for company and firm-specific factors. Both ISS and Glass Lewis made
revisions in 2020 to their voting policies to address the growing trend of ESG, which will likely
be impactful on future vote outcomes. ISS announced a new thematic specialty Climate Voting
Policy, under which they will recommend adverse votes on the re-election of board members for
companies that appear to have “failed to sufficiently oversee, manage or guard against material

climate-change related risks,” based on signals such as inadequate disclosure, norm violations, or
the assessment of sector-specific materiality metrics, with specific focus on companies on the
Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list. Glass Lewis followed suit with a similar policy that will
note inadequate disclosure on environmental issues in their research reports and, beginning in
2022, recommend votes against governance committee chairs of S&P 500 companies. Both also
have a number of policies regarding gender and racial board diversity and racial equity and civil
rights audits.
Third, shareholders may turn to publicity campaigns to put pressure on the company.
Fourth, activists may attempt to replace members of a company’s board of directors in what is
called a proxy contest. This form of shareholder activism is most associated with activist hedge
funds, as they involve often-expensive campaigns to persuade other shareholders to vote for their
slate of candidates. Publicity campaigns may be used in proxy fights via open letters to
management or white papers that detail the proposed changes. Proxy fights are often avoided
through settlements where the company might concede seats and promise changes. In the case of
Engine No. 1 and ExxonMobil, the latter attempted unsuccessfully to avoid the proxy fight by
making an agreement with D.E. Shaw, who also had expressed concerns, and using the
agreement as leverage.
In the 2000s, hedge fund activism saw increased popularity, prompting scholarship such
as Brav et. al’s 2008 study, which looks at hedge fund activism between 2001 to 2006 and
speculates that different incentive structures and organizational structures of hedge funds are
what allow them to be more successful. First, the study gauges market reactions to
announcements of investment by examining abnormal returns and trading volume following 13D
filings, which reveal an activist’s investment in a target firm. It found that there was a +7-8%

effect during the announcement window that was not reversed even one year post-event. Next,
the study also notably examines cross-sections of the abnormal returns based on the nature of the
activism, with business strategy-related efforts generating positive, significant abnormal returns,
whereas capital-structure related activism and governance related activism produced positive, but
insignificant results. According to Brav, Jiang, and Kim, there were over 150 activist hedge
funds operating each year by the mid-2000s. Our study does not specifically look at hedge funds,
but rather encompasses all activists, from individuals to hedge funds to pension funds.
Other literature suggests that activism, particularly by institutional investors, does not
increase shareholder value, or that the effect has changed over time. For instance, Romano
(2001) found an insignificant effect on targeted firms’ performance. A Karpoff (2001) survey of
empirical findings cited persuasive evidence that average abnormal long-run return is not
significantly positive. Another important study conducted by Gillan and Starks in 2007 notes the
difficulty present in the scholarship in establishing a causal relationship between shareholder
activism and subsequent changes in firm behavior, as well as in merely identifying activist
events. Despite short term positive reactions, the study found that evidence of long-term
operating improvement of targeted firms was sparse. These studies also purely examined
shareholder activism broadly, without screening for social impact.
In their 2012 study, Dimson, Karakas, and Li studied 2,152 corporate social responsibility
(CSR) engagements for 613 public U.S. companies and found that within the sample, successful
corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagements had +4.4% one-year abnormal return,
whereas there was no reaction to unsuccessful ones. A study by Barko, Cremers, and Renneboog
(2017) studies how shareholder engagements by a specific socially responsible activist fund
improve ESG practices at target firms, finding that engaged firms are able to outperform their

peers on ESG metrics by 7.5% after one year. Thus, much has been done in analyzing the impact
of shareholder activism, both in terms of financial and operating performance and in terms of
social impact. However, a limited number of studies have touched trends, which is also an
important aspect in understanding how ESG will continue to evolve. For instance, Barko et al’s
study importantly also finds that target firms are likely to have low-ESG performance when
engaged, and that engagements were more likely to be successful if “targets are ESG-sensitive.”
Dimson, Karakas, and Li also looked at the success rate of their sample set’s engagements, which
they found to be 18%.
Our study reflects the changing profile of activists, taking a similar approach to Dimson,
Karakas, and Li in sampling engagements, but focusing on identifying trends in market
participant actions. It builds on previous literature that has examined, separately, hedge fund
activism; shareholder activism by mutual funds; and shareholder activism by ESG mutual funds.
Ultimately, this study aims to contribute to understandings about activist and investor
behavior–what firms are being targeted for ESG-related proposals, how often ESG-related
proposals are successful, and how the success of ESG-related proposals has changed over time.

Data & Methods
Two data sets were combined for this project, both of which were provided by Wharton
Research Data Services. First, we use Institutional Shareholder Service’s data on Shareholder
Proposals from the years 2010 through 2020, which included for each proposal the following: the
company name and ticker; the meeting date, year, and code (‘Annual’, ‘Proxy Contest’,
‘Special’, ‘Written Consent’); a brief description of the resolution and the resolution type (‘SRI’
or ‘GOV’); the sponsor name and sponsor type; and the resolution’s required support, level of
support, and whether or not it passed. 68 different sponsor types are represented in the dataset,

with the most frequent sponsor types being ‘Individual’, ‘SRI fund’, and ‘Public Pension’. A full
list of sponsor types and counts can be found in the appendix (A-1). Among the resolutions,
“sustainability” appears 395 times, “diversity” appears 336 times, “climate” appears 167 times,
and “emissions” appears 169 times. A list of the top 50 most frequent resolution texts is available
in the appendix (A-2).
Second, we use Standard and Poor’s Global ESG Scores data, which provides
sustainability scores on a number of dimensions that evaluate a range of environmental, social,
and governance issues based on S&P’s Global Corporate Sustainability Assessment (CSA). The
data are available from 2013 onwards. For this project, we drew data based on the tickers in the
ISS data set, for a total of 877 companies, and included the overall ESG score, the assessment
year, and industry classification.
Data preparation was done primarily through Python. One of the primary challenges
during this project was the obtention of workable and comprehensive data, especially when
merging two data sets. The two data sets were merged by year (matching the proposal year and
assessment year) and company (using the ticker variable). Because the ESG score data were only
available from 2013-2020, the first three years of ISS data were dropped, leaving us with 7,533
observations.
Then, because the ISS data’s ‘passed’ variable only included ‘Yes’s and were missing
values otherwise, the missing values were filled in with ‘No’ if the level of support was less than
the resolution’s required support. Finally, ‘passed’ was converted into a binary categorical
integer variable, with value 0 if the resolution did not pass and value 1 if it did pass, to calculate
percentages later on. Similarly, the variable ‘ESGrelated’ was created with value 0 if the
resolution type was ‘GOV’ (governance) and value 1 if the type was ‘SRI’ (socially responsible

investing), as categorized by the ISS data. The ISS data set included 1,095 companies without
present-day tickers as some were private or are now private. Without tickers, no ESG score or
industry classification data was available for them; thus, those rows were not included in any
analysis that incorporated those two variables.
It should be noted that in this study, I use ‘ESG-related’ to refer to what the ISS data
classifies as ‘SRI’ and in contrast to what ISS classifies as a governance resolution, even though
governance is a part of ESG. This is because whereas the environmental factor of ESG relates to
climate change and sustainability, encompassing topics like pollution, deforestation, and carbon
emissions and the social factor considers people, with topics like diversity and inclusion,
acceptable labor standards, and health and wellness, the governance factor describes standards
for running a company like board composition, executive compensation, and audit committee
structure. In many ways, governance issues are at the core of traditional shareholder activism, in
addition to capital allocation issues, although some aspects of governance, such as board
diversity, do overlap with social issues. Thus, this study will focus on the environmental and
social aspects of ESG to differentiate nascent engagements that consider social impact from
traditional shareholder activism that focuses on maximizing return on investment.

Results
Data analysis for this paper was conducted using STATA. First, we are interested in
looking at the breakdown between ‘SRI’ and ‘GOV’ proposals across the data set, so the data
was tabulated by ‘data_year’ and ‘resolution_type’.

Figure 1: ‘GOV’ vs. ‘SRI’ Shareholder Proposals by Year

Note: This figure shows the count of proposals by type (governance or SRI related) by year, as well as what
percentage each type of proposal comprised of the year’s total proposal count.

Figure 2: Visualization of Breakdown, 2013 vs. 2020

Note: These charts show the breakdown of ‘GOV’ vs. ‘SRI’ proposals for 2013, which had 988 total proposals, and
2020, which had 898 total proposals.

In the figures above, we see evidence that there has been an increase in the percentage of
shareholder proposals that are SRI-related since 2013, when 64% were governance related. By
2020, that percentage decreased to 54%, which perhaps reflects the growing popularity of ESG
as a consideration for activists, whether because of impact-oriented morals and values or because
of strategic reasons, such as addressing a business’s climate risks to unlock value. Once again, it
is important to acknowledge how ESG serves as an umbrella term that encompasses both SRI
and governance, and how there can exist overlap between SRI and governance issues.
Next, I examine how the passage rates of SRI proposals have changed over time, which
was done by taking the mean of the ‘passed’ variable for SRI proposals for each year of the data.

Figure 3: Percentage of SRI Proposals Passed

Note: This graph shows the percentage of SRI-related proposals that were passed from 2013-2020.

From 2013-2015, only around 1% or less of SRI-related proposals passed, before
increasing to about 2% from 2016-2019. In 2020, over 4% of SRI-related proposals passed,
indicating that willingness to support ESG-related resolutions is increasing among investors.

Two possible explanations are an inherent change in individual preferences and the influence of
proxy advisors as they begin to recommend voting for such resolutions.
In addition to examining trends across years, we also wanted to examine possible
differences across industries. In a breakdown by industry, we are interested in seeing: (1)
whether certain industries are more popular targets for shareholder proposals and (2) whether
shareholder proposals see higher success rates in certain industries.

Figure 4: Proposal Counts and Success Rates Across Industries

Note: This figure shows the number of ‘SRI’ and ‘GOV’ proposals for each industry as well as the percentage of
proposals that passed. The top 5 industries in terms of counts are summarized in the second table.

The table above provides a number of interesting observations. First, we see that the five
industries that were the target of the most number of shareholder proposals overall were:
Retailing, Banks, Diversified Financial Services & Capital Markets, IT Services, and
Telecommunication Services. Interestingly, the top fourth and fifth industries for ‘SRI’ and
‘GOV’ were unique: Oil & Gas Upstream & Integrated and Food Products for ‘SRI’ and
Pharmaceuticals and Machinery & Electrical Equipment for ‘GOV’. Looking broadly at the
table, we can see that there are quite big differences in how each industry experiences
shareholder proposals–some, like Banks and Biotechnology, have a much lower proportion of
SRI-related proposals, than other industries like Oil & Gas Upstream & Integrated and Multi and
Water Utilities, for which the majority of proposals are SRI-related.
Second, we see that success rates for ‘GOV’ proposals are greater than ‘SRI’ proposals
for the vast majority of industries. The exceptions are Household Durables, Household Products,
Oil & Gas Upstream & Integrated, and Trading Companies and Distributors.
Finally, there are a few industries in which the success rate of shareholder proposals is
0.00% across all years of data, which is rather surprising. These include Aluminum, Building
Products, Beverages, Coal & Consumable Fuels, Personal Products, Paper & Forest Products,
Homebuilding, and Tobacco.

Although we can see from this table that the overall success rate of ‘SRI’ proposals is
2.14% compared to a success rate of 17.93% for ‘GOV’ proposals, I run a regression analysis
below to see whether this difference is statistically significant.. I incorporate year fixed effects
into the regression by creating a dummy variable ‘y_’ for each year to control for the differences
across time in the data. The results show that SRI-related proposal passage rates are on average
9.78% less than their ‘GOV’ counterparts, when controlling for year fixed effects.

Figure 5: Regression of Passage Rate on ‘ESGrelated’ with Year Fixed Effects

Note: This regression uses ‘ESGrelated’, the variable which gives 1 if the proposal is ‘SRI’ and 0 if it is ‘GOV’ to
predict the passage rate of proposals. Each ‘y_’ variable represents a year.

Next, we want to see if the trend of increasing passage rates for SRI-related proposals we
observed in Figure 3 is statistically significant, so I run a regression of passage rate on
‘data_year’. The coefficient for ‘data_year’ is 0.004, or 0.4%, with a p-value = 0, meaning that

that when only looking at resolutions that are SRI-related, each year predicts a 0.4% increase in
passage rates, suggesting that shareholders have become increasingly willing to vote for
SRI-related proposals.
Figure 6: Regression of Passage Rate on ‘data_year’

Finally, we are interested in whether a target company’s ESG scores are related to the
success of shareholder proposals. The first regression I run includes all proposals (ESG-related
or not). I find that target companies whose shareholders passed their resolutions (SRI related or
not) had ESG scores that were on average 7 points lower than those for whom resolutions failed.
This supports the findings in Barko, Cremers, and Renneboog (2017) that targets were most
likely to have poor ESG performance, although their paper used only data from a single activist,
whereas this analysis uses shareholder proposal data from 838 different sponsors.

Figure 7: Regression of ESG Score on ‘passed’

In the second, I create an interaction term ‘ESGpassed’ that gives 1 if the proposal is
ESG-related and passed and 0 otherwise to identify if there is a statistically significant difference
in ESG scores between companies whose proposals were ESG-related and passed and companies
whose proposals were either not ESG-related or did not pass. Indeed, firms who were the subject
of an SRI-related proposal that successfully passed had ESG scores that were, on average, 12
points less than those that did not.
Figure 8: Regression of ESG Score on ‘ESGpassed’

Conclusion
In this study, I examined (1) the breakdown between SRI-related and governance related
shareholder proposals over time and across industries, (2) trends in passage rates of SRI-related
proposals over time and across industries, and (3) the relationship between passage rates of
shareholder proposals and the ESG scores of the target firms, using shareholder proposal data
from 2013-2020 combined with ESG score data. Overall, I have summarized some observable
trends in the shareholder proposals data that indicate a rise in both ESG-related proposals
submitted and investor approval of ESG-related resolutions. I also find significant results
showing a correlation between firms that were the target of successful resolutions and low ESG
scores, which suggests that firms that neglect corporate social responsibility may be more
vulnerable to shareholder activism.
This study has a number of limitations. One significant limitation is the generalizability
of these conclusions to all forms of shareholder activism. As discussed in the Background
section, shareholder activism can take many forms, which are not all captured by shareholder
proposals. Second, a number of observations were dropped from the data set because they were
incomplete and thus could not be appropriately merged with necessary data on company industry
classifications and ESG scores. Finally, the analysis of the relationship between target firms
whose resolutions were passed by investors and the target firms’ ESG scores should only be seen
as correlational, not causal.
Trends in these aspects of shareholder proposals hold important implications for both
target firms and investors. According to ISS, of the firms in the S&P 500, around 170 have set
ambitious emissions targets, over 210 firms have no targets, and the rest have set weak targets.
This implies that ESG considerations, though much more popular now than a decade ago,

remains a low or nonexistent priority for many firms. If ESG-related activism has had positive
effects on financial performance, it could influence firms to proactively adopt better standards
and goals in order to deliver more value to their shareholders. It could also incentivize firms to
be proactive in improving their ESG metrics to avoid being the target of future activism efforts.
Second, the results of the relatively nascent integration of ESG principles into traditional hedge
fund activism will be closely watched by other activist hedge funds, as well as investors in the
space, who are the sources of capital for these funds. Demonstrated success as a result of this
could drive even more widespread incorporation of ESG into investing, not just by mutual funds.
Individual investors and other sources of capital would be interested in knowing if there is
evidence that ESG-related activism by activist hedge funds can achieve a similar social impact as
these mutual funds while delivering better returns, because this could influence where they
choose to invest their capital.
Although this paper does not study the impact of ESG-related shareholder activism on
financial performance or improvements in ESG-related metrics, it does contribute to our
understanding of the attitudes and behaviors of two important and not mutually exclusive
stakeholders – activists and shareholders – which in many ways reflects the knowledge that these
stakeholders have about the value of ESG. As such, the natural extension of this research may
return to analysis of the materiality of ESG engagements, or could examine how the type of
sponsor affects the success rates of shareholder proposals. This paper builds off of previous
literature and provides refreshed insights using recent data, reflecting a world very different from
the one a decade or two ago, where ESG is increasingly the norm rather than the exception.
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